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Abstract
We consider optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a New Keynesian model of a small open
economy with sticky prices and wages. In this benchmark setting monetary policy is all we need
- analytical results demonstrate that variations in government spending should play no role in
the stabilization of shocks. In extensions we show, firstly, that this is even when true when
allowing for inflation inertia through backward-looking rule-of-thumb price and wage-setting, as
long as there is no discrepancy between the private and social evaluation of the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. Secondly, the optimal neutrality of government
spending is robust to the issuance of public debt. In the presence of debt government spending
will deviate from the optimal steady-state but only to the extent required to cover the deficit, not
to provide any additional macroeconomic stabilization. However, unlike government spending
variations in tax rates can play a complementary role to monetary policy, as they change relative
prices rather than demand.
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1 Introduction
We address the issue of whether fiscal policy should be used as a demand management tool when
monetary policy is set in an optimal and unconstrained manner. As recent events have shown, there
remain occasions in which policymakers wish to supplement monetary policy with fiscal action to
control the business cycle, but these actions remain controversial among macroeconomists. In the
main part of this paper we focus on fiscal policy as a tool for influencing aggregate demand, as
opposed to a means of changing relative prices. To do this we use government spending as our
fiscal instrument, although we note towards the end how some results would change if taxes were
the fiscal instrument.
We begin by setting out a baseline model that combines what are generally regarded as core
features of New Keynesian models: imperfectly competitive firms subject to Calvo contracts, house-
holds making optimal, intertemporal choices over consumption and labour supply, and a social wel-
fare function derived from their utility. In addition, we introduce a nominal wage rigidity as this
adds both realism and removes the ability of monetary policy to completely offset the impact of
technology and preference shocks. Analytical results show that changes in the government spend-
ing gap should not be used to supplement optimal monetary policy under either commitment or
discretion, whether shocks come from technology, changes in preferences or are mark-up shocks.1
In this sense fiscal policy should not be used for aggregate demand management when monetary
policy is unconstrained.
We then consider how robust these results might be to two extensions of the model. A common
theme of empirical studies is that the economy is subject to some degree of inflation inertia, in the
sense that lagged inflation appears alongside expected inflation in the Phillips curve. We model
this with backward-looking rule of thumb-behaviour of both wage- and price-setters. Importantly,
we show that government spending still has no role to play in stabilization if there is no endogenous
wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure as seen by the
social planner and wage setters. For if such a wedge exists the policymaker could use the government
1The closed economy case with flexible wages is examined in detail in Eser (2009), which is a revised and extended
version of Eser (2006).
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spending gap to exploit this difference in wage/price setting.
Our baseline model also ignores debt. Once we allow shocks to change the stock of government
debt in the absence of lump sum taxes, the optimal government spending gap is no longer zero.
However we show that this gap moves to a new, constant level designed to finance higher debt,
and therefore does not play a countercyclical role. Finally we discuss the extent to which these
results apply only to government spending as an instrument, representing a demand management
role for fiscal policy. We show that variations in tax rates, by changing relative prices, can play a
complementary role to monetary policy.
It is important to restate that we restrict ourselves to settings where monetary policy is un-
constrained in the sense that there is no direct cost in varying interest rates to influence aggregate
demand and we ignore the possibility of interest rates hitting a zero lower bound, a consideration
that might well justify a fiscal response to severe deflation. In addition if, for some reason, mone-
tary policy was constrained to follow a simple form of Taylor rule, then this could reprise a role for
fiscal demand management (see Eser (2009) but also Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007)). We also
ignore frictions on the monetary side. These are considered in Eser (2009) which shows that a fiscal
stabilization role can arise if monetary frictions exist, even when monetary policy is set optimally.
The main reason for this is that in that under monetary frictions variations of the interest rate
directly lead to a social loss of second order. Furthermore, we exclude any uncertainty about the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. While all these considerations may be important in
practice, the case where monetary policy is optimal and unconstrained seems like a natural starting
point for analysis.
2 Baseline Model
This section outlines our baseline model. It is for a small open economy where consumers have a
bias to purchase domestically produced goods, which has the advantage that a closed economy is
a special case of the model where this home bias is complete. The model is similar in structure
to Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), with the main addition being the presence of sticky wages as well
2
as sticky prices. The core ingredients of the closed economy version of the model - intertemporal
optimisation by consumers over goods and leisure and Calvo contracts - are common to a large
number of papers in the literature.
2.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one, who differ in that they provide differentiated
labour services to firms in their economy. However, we shall assume full asset markets, such that,
through risk sharing, they will face the same budget constraint and make the same consumption
plans even if they face different wage rates due to stickiness in wage-setting. We assume the typical
household maximises the following objective function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnCt + χ lnGt − Nt(k)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
, (1)
where Ct, Gt and Nt are a consumption aggregate, a public goods aggregate, and labour supply
respectively. χ denotes the relative weight of government spending in the utility function. The only
notation referring to the specific household k indexes the labour input, as full financial markets
will imply that all other variables are constant across households. The consumption aggregate is
defined as Ct =
C1−αH,t C
α
F,t
(1−α)(1−α)αα . The composite of domestically produced goods is given by
CH,t = (
∫ 1
0
CH,t(j)
−1
 dj)

−1 (2)
where j denotes the good’s variety. The aggregate CF,t is an aggregate across countries i CF,t =
(
∫ 1
0 C
γ−1
γ
i,t di)
γ
γ−1 , where Ci,t is an aggregate similar to (2). γ measures the substitutability between
goods produced in different foreign countries. For convenience we assume γ = 1 in what follows.
This assumption, together with international risk sharing discussed below, helps make aspects of
open economy problem isomorphic to the closed economy, which greatly simplifies the analysis (see
Benigno and De Paoli (2009) and Kirsanova et al. (2006). Finally, the public goods aggregate is
given by Gt = (
∫ 1
0 Gt(j)
−1
 dj)

−1 , which implies that public goods are all domestically produced.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties  > 1 is common across countries.
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The parameter α is (inversely) related to the degree of home bias in preferences, and is a natural
measure of openness. If α = 1 we have no home bias, and the only potential connection between
domestic consumption and domestic output is through income, although this is in turn modified
by international risk sharing, which we discuss below. If α = 0 we have a closed economy.
The budget constraint at time t is given by
Πt +Dt +Wt(k)Nt(k)(1− τt)− Tt
=
∫ 1
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j)dj +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Pi,t(j)Ci,t(j)djdi+ Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1},
where Pi,t(j) is the price of variety j imported from country i expressed in home currency, Dt+1 is
the nominal payoff of the portfolio held at the end of period t, Πt is the representative household’s
share of profits in the imperfectly competitive firms, W are wages, τt is an wage income tax rate,
and Tt are lump sum taxes. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payoffs.
Households first decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure across the various goods that
are available, minimising the cost of consumption. Optimisation of expenditure for any individual
good implies the demand functions
CH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−
CH , Ci,t(j) =
(
Pi,t(j)
Pi,t
)−
Ci,t.
The associated price indices are given by
PH,t =
(∫ 1
0
PH,t(j)1−dj
) 1
1−
, Pi,t =
(∫ 1
0
Pi,t(j)1−dj
) 1
1−
.
It follows that
∫ 1
0 PH,t(j)CH,t(j)dj = PH,tCH,t and
∫ 1
0 Pi,t(j)Ci,t(j)dj = Pi,tCi,t. Optimisation
across imported goods by country implies
∫ 1
0 Pi,tCi,tdi = PF,tCF,t. Defining the consumer price
index (CPI) as
Pt = P 1−αH,t P
α
F,t, (3)
optimisation between imported and domestically produced goods implies PH,tCH,t = (1 − α)PtCt
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and PF,tCF,t = αPtCt. With these results the budget constraint can be written as
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Πt +Dt +Wt(k)Nt(k)(1− τt)− Tt. (4)
The first of the household’s intertemporal problems involves allocating consumption expenditure
across time. This implies
βRtEt
[
Ct
Ct+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
= 1, (5)
where Rt = 1Et{Qt,t+1} is the gross return on a riskless one period bond paying off a unit of domestic
currency in t+ 1. A log-linearised version of (5) can be written as
ct = Et{ct+1} − (rt − Et{pit+1} − ρ), (6)
where lowercase denotes logs, ρ = 1β−1. Consumer price inflation (CPI) is defined as pit ≡ pt−pt−1.
The modelling of households’ wage-setting behaviour essentially follows Erceg et al. (2000).
They apply Calvo pricing to wage setting. We assume that firms need to employ a CES aggregate
of the labour of all households in the domestic production of consumer goods. This is provided by
an ‘aggregator’ that aggregates the labour services of all households in the economy as
Nt =
[∫ 1
0
Nt(k)
w−1
w dk
] w
w−1
,
where Nt(k) is the labour provided by household k to the aggregator. We allow the degree of
labour differentiation to vary in response to independent and identically distributed random shocks
which introduce the possibility of wage mark-up shocks. Accordingly the demand curve facing each
household is given by
Nt(k) =
(
Wt(k)
Wt
)−w
Nt, (7)
where Nt, the CES aggregate of labour services in the economy, also equals the total labour services
employed by firms: Nt =
∫ 1
0 Nt(j) dj, where Nt(j) is the labour employed by firm j. The price
of this labour is given by the wage index Wt =
[∫ 1
0 Wt(k)
1−wdk
]1−w
. The household’s objective
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function for the setting of its nominal wage is given by
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(θwβ)s
(
Λt+s
Wt(k)
Pt+s
(1− τt+s)Nt+s(k)− (Nt+s(k))
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)]
, (8)
where Λt+s = C−1t+s is the marginal utility of real post-tax income, and 1−θw is the probability that
nominal wages change in a given period. As detailed in appendix A.2, the first order condition from
this problem can be combined with the aggregate wage index to give a log-linearised expression for
wage-inflation dynamics,
piwt = βEtpi
w
t+1 +
λw
1 + ϕw
(ϕnt − (wt − pt) + ct − ln(1− τt) + µwt ) (9)
where λw =
(1−θwβ)(1−θw)
θw
and eµ
w
t is the desired wage-markup in the absence of wage stickiness,
which fluctuates around ww−1 in response to iid wage mark-up shocks. The forcing variable in this
New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is a log-linearised measure of the extent to which wages are
not at the level implied by the labour supply decision that would hold under flexible wages.
The allocation of government spending across goods is determined by minimising total costs,∫ 1
0 PH(j)G(j)dj. Given the form of the basket of public goods this implies Gt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−
Gt.
2.2 The exchange rate and risk sharing
The bilateral terms of trade are the price of country i’s goods relative to home goods prices, and
is given by Si,t ≡ Pi,tPH,t . Thus, the effective terms of trade relative to the rest of the world are given
by
St = PF,t
PH,t
. (10)
Combining (10) with (3), the domestic CPI, producer prices and the effective terms of trade can
be related in terms of logs as
pt = pH,t + αst. (11)
Trade in goods is assumed to be free and costless. Thus, the law of one price holds for individual
goods at all times. This implies Pi,t(j) = Ei,tP ii,t(j) for all i, j ∈ [0, 1], where Ei,t is the bilateral
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nominal exchange rate. P ii,t(j) is the price of county i’s good j expressed in terms of country
i’s currency. Aggregating across goods implies Pi,t = Ei,tP ii,t, where P ii ≡
(∫ 1
0 P
i
i (j)
1−dj
) 1
1− .
From the definition of PF,t we have, log-linearised around the symmetric steady state, pF,t =∫ 1
0 (ei,t + p
i
i,t)di = et + p
∗
t , where et =
∫ 1
0 ei,tdi is the log of the nominal effective exchange rate, p
i
i,t
is the logged domestic price index for country i, and p∗t =
∫ 1
0 p
i
i,t di is the log of the world price
index.
Combining the definition of the terms of trade and the result just obtained gives st = et + p∗t −
pH,t. The bilateral real exchange rate is defined as
Qi,t ≡ Ei,tPi,t
Pt
, (12)
where Pi,t and Pt are the two countries’ respective CPI levels. In logged form we can define the
real effective exchange rate as
qt =
∫ 1
0
(ei,t + pit − pt) di = (1− α)st. (13)
We assume a perfect international insurance markets for national income risk, so complete interna-
tional risk-sharing holds. For the representative household in any other country i a consumption
Euler equation holds
βRtEt
[
Cit
Cit+1
P it
P it+1
Ei,t
Ei,t+1
]
= 1. (14)
Combining (5), (14) and (12) we obtain Qi,t+1
(
Cit+1
Ct+1
)
= Qi,t
(
Cit
Ct
)
. This can be iterated backwards
so that Ct = zit−1CitQi,t, where zit−1 ≡ Qi,t−1
Cit−1
Ct−1 depends on the initial relative net asset condi-
tions. If net foreign asset holdings are zero and the environments identical ex ante, i.e. the initial
conditions are symmetric, then zit−1 = 1. Then the bilateral risk-sharing condition is Ct = CitQi,t.
Log-linearising this, integrating over all countries i and using (13) the condition characterising
international risk-sharing (IRS) with the rest of the world is
ct = c∗t + (1− α)st. (15)
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where c∗t is the average level of consumption in the rest of the world.
2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Technology
Firms face the demand curve Yt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)− (
(1− α)PtCtPH,t + α
∫ 1
0
εiP
i
tC
i
t
PH,t
di+Gt
)
, which we
rewrite as Yt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−
Yt, where aggregate output is defined as
Yt ≡
[∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
. (16)
For any firm j the production function is linear, Yt(j) = AtNt(j), where At is a stochastic
technology-shock. The aggregate of the individual firms’ demand for labour is
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i) di =
Yt
At
∆t, (17)
where price dispersion is defined as ∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
P(H,t)(i)
P(H,t)
)−
di. As shown, for instance, in Woodford
(2003), variations of ∆t around the steady-state are of second-order importance. Thus, to a first-
order (17) can be approximated as
yt = at + nt. (18)
2.3.2 Price-Setting
The objective function of the firm is given by
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(θ)sQt,t+s
(
(1− τ st+s)
PH,t(j)
Pt+s
Yt+s(j)− (1− κ)Wt+s
Pt+s
Yt+s(j)
At+s
)]
, (19)
where κ is an employment subsidy which can be used to eliminate the steady-state distortion
associated with monopolistic competition and distortionary production and income taxes, assuming
there is a lump-sum tax available to finance such a subsidy. τ st is a production tax. As labour is the
only factor of production in this model, the production tax is equivalent to a variable employment
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subsidy. In a closed economy, the production tax is equivalent to a sales tax. 1−θ is the probability
of a price change in a given period. As shown in appendix A.1 optimisation implies the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 + λ(mct + µt), (20)
where λ = (1−θβ)(1−θ)θ , mct = wt − pH,t − at − ln(1 − τ st ) − vt are the real log-linearised marginal
costs of production, v = − ln(1−κ) and eµt is the desired mark-up which fluctuates around −1 is
response to iid shocks.
2.4 Equilibrium
Goods market clearing requires, for each good j, Yt(j) = CH,t(j) +
∫ 1
0 C
i
H,t(j)di + Gt(j). Sym-
metrical preferences imply CiH,t(j) = α(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−
(
PH,t
Ei,tP it
)−1
Cit which allows us to write Yt(j) =(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)− (
(1− α)PtCtPH,t + α
∫ 1
0
Ei,tP itCit
PH,t
di+Gt
)
. Using (16) we obtain Yt = (1−α)PtCtPH,t +α
∫ 1
0 (
εiP
i
tC
i
t
PH,t
)di+
Gt, which can be written as
Yt = CtSαt +Gt (21)
Then (21) can be written to a first order approximation as
yt = (1− γ) (ct + αst) + γgt, (22)
where γ = GY is the steady-state share of government spending in output, which is related to
structural model parameters below. To obtain the world wide goods market clearing condition we
can simply integrate over (22) to obtain y∗t = (1− γ)c∗t + γg∗t .
Defining the real wage as ωt ≡ wt − pH,t, (20) can be written as Phillips Curve (NKPC) which
is given by
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 + λ (ωt − at − ln(1− τ st )− v + µt) (23)
As shown above, wage inflation dynamics follow (9). The forcing variable captures the extent
to which the consumer’s labour supply decision is not the same as it would be under flexible wages.
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Using (11), (22) and (18), (9) can be written as
piwt = βEtpi
w
t+1 + λ˜w
[(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
yt − γ1− γ gt − ωt − ϕat − ln(1− τt) + µ
w
t
]
, (24)
where λ˜w ≡ λw1+ϕw . Finally substituting (11), (22) in (5), we obtain an IS-relation as
yt = Etyt+1 − γ∆Etgt+1 − (1− γ) (rt − EtpiH,t+1 − ρ) . (25)
3 Optimal policy in the Benchmark Model
3.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
To develop an objective function with which to evaluate optimal policy it is helpful to begin
by analysing the social planner’s problem. The social planner simply decides how to allocate
consumption and production of goods within the economy, subject to the various constraints implied
by operating as part of a larger group of economies. Since they are concerned with real allocations,
the social planner ignores nominal inertia and distortionary taxation in deriving optimal allocations.
Accordingly, the solution to the social planner’s problem provides a benchmark for optimal policy,
and can be used to compute the steady-state subsidy which would ensure the steady-state is efficient.
The social planner maximises (1) subject to technology (17), market clearing (22) and risk
sharing (15), which can be combined as
lnCt = α lnC∗t + (1− α) ln(Yt −Gt). (26)
As it is optimal to supply equal amounts of labour and produce equal amounts of each good,
technology simplifies to Yt = AtNt, and the problem can be written as
max
Gt,Yt
[α lnC∗t + (1− α) ln(Yt −Gt)] + χ lnGt −
(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
(27)
Let the superscript e denotes efficient levels. With regard to government spending and output this
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implies the two optimality conditions
N e = (1− α+ χ) 11+ϕ , (28)
and
Ge
Y e
=
χ
1− α+ χ. (29)
3.2 The Decentralised Flexible Price Equilibrium
Having considered the social planner’s problem we now proceed to compare this to the decentralised
equilibrium in our economy assuming there is no nominal inertia. This has two reasons. Firstly, it
allows us to define the subsidy required to eliminate the distortions that would otherwise render our
steady-state inefficient. Imposing this subsidy eliminates the usual inflationary bias problems that
would otherwise emerge and allows us to focus on stabilisation policy. Secondly, by then contrasting
the outcome under nominal inertia with this flexible price solution we can derive a measure of welfare
which captures the extent to which such frictions have been overcome by stabilisation policy.
Profit-maximising behaviour, under flexible prices and wages, implies that firms will operate at
the point at which marginal costs equal marginal revenues,
(
1− 1

)(
1− 1
w
)
=
(1− κ)
(1− τ s)(1− τ)(N
n)(1+ϕ)(1− G
n
Y n
) (30)
Now if Gn is given by the optimal rule then
1− G
n
Y n
=
1− α
1− α+ χ (31)
Thus γ = χ1−α+χ . If the subsidy κ is given by
(1− κ) = (1− 1

)(1− 1
w
)(1− τ s)(1− τ)/(1− α) (32)
then
Nn = (1− α+ χ) 11+ϕ (33)
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and employment is identical to the optimal level of employment above. Here the subsidy has to
overcome the distortions due to monopoly pricing in the goods and labour markets, as well as any
distortionary income and sales taxes.
We can now use the flexible price equilibrium to redefine key equations in terms of gap variables,
where for any variable xt, x˜t = xt − xnt denotes the gap between actual values and the notional
value of that variable in a flex-price economy. We can write the price Phillips curve as
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 + λ (ω˜t − ln(1− τ˜ st ) + µ˜t) , (34)
where ln(1− τ˜ st ) ≡ ln(1− τ st )− ln(1− τn,st ). The wage Phillips curve becomes
piwt = βEtpi
w
t+1 + λ˜w
[(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
y˜t − γ1− γ g˜t − ω˜t − ln(1− τ˜t) + µ˜
w
t
]
, (35)
where ln(1− τ˜t) ≡ ln(1− τt)− ln(1− τnt ).
From the definition of the real-wage gap ω˜t ≡ ωt − ωnt it is straightforward to derive a relation
between price- and wage-inflation which constitutes an additional equilibrium condition
ω˜t ≡ ω˜t−1 − pit + piwt −∆ωnt . (36)
Finally the IS curve becomes
y˜t = Ety˜t+1 − γ∆Etg˜t+1 − (1− γ) (rt − EtpiH,t+1 − rnt ) , (37)
where rnt ≡ ρ+ (1− γ)−1
(
∆Etynt+1 − γ∆Etgnt+1
)
is the natural rate of interest.
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3.3 Optimal Policy
Appendix A.3 derives the loss function as a second-order approximation to the agent’s utility, (1),
around the steady state.
− (1− α+ χ)
2
∞∑
t=0
βtLt + t.i.p.+ o
(
‖a‖3
)
, (38)
where the per-period loss term is given by
Lt =

λ
pi2t +
w
λ˜w
(piwt )
2 + (1 + ϕ)y˜2 +
χ
1− α (g˜t − y˜t)
2 . (39)
We now proceed to consider optimal policy under both commitment and discretion.
3.3.1 Optimal Commitment Policy
In order to derive optimal policy under commitment, we define the Lagrangian of the policymaker’s
problem as
Lt = −12
∞∑
t=0
βt[

λ
pi2H,t +
w
λ˜w
(piwt )
2 + (1 + ϕ)y˜2 +
χ
1− α (g˜t − y˜t)
2
− 2Λpct (βEtpiH,t+1 + λ (ω˜t − ln(1− τ˜ st ) + µ˜t)− piH,t)
− 2Λpcwt (βEtpiwt+1 + λ˜w
[(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
y˜t − γ1− γ g˜t − ω˜t − ln(1− τ˜t) + µ˜
w
t
]
− piwt )
− 2Λwt (ω˜t−1 − pit + piwt −∆ωnt − ω˜t)],
(40)
where Λpc,Λpcwt ,Λ
w
t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the price- and wage-Phillips-
Curve as well as the wage-equation. The IS-relation does not enter as a constraint, as the nominal
interest-rate can always be set optimally as a residual so as to make the IS-relation non-binding. The
optimality conditions under commitment for real wages, inflation, wage-inflation, the government-
spending gap, and the output gap are, in that order:
λΛpct − λ˜wΛpcwt − Λwt + βΛwt+1 = 0 (41)
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− 
λ
pit − Λpct + Λpct−1 − Λwt = 0 (42)
− w
λ˜w
piwt − Λpcwt + Λpcwt−1 + Λwt = 0 (43)
− χ
1− α(g˜t − y˜t)− λ˜w
γ
1− γΛ
pcw
t = 0 (44)
χ
1− α(g˜t − y˜t)− (1 + ϕ)y˜t + λ˜w
(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
Λpcwt = 0. (45)
These hold for all t ≥ 0, where Λpc−1 = Λpcw−1 = 0. The fact that these two multipliers are set to zero
when t = 0 implies that the first order conditions are different in the initial period than subsequent
periods and the solution time inconsistent. However, by just combining the optimality conditions
for government spending and output (44) and (45), and recalling γ = χ1−α+χ , we obtain
g˜t = 0. (46)
The optimal government spending gap is zero under commitment.
3.3.2 Discretionary Policy
Since the real wage is an endogenous state variable in this problem, we cannot examine the initial
first-order conditions from the commitment solution to derive the solution under discretion. Instead
we must set-up the Bellman equation to describe the optimal time-consistent policy
V (ω˜t−1, ωnt−1) = ming˜t,y˜t (
1
2
(

λ
pi2H,t+
w
λ˜w
(piwt )
2+(1+ϕ)y˜2+
χ
1− α (g˜t − y˜t)
2)+βEtV (ω˜t, ωnt )) (47)
V (ω˜t−1, ωnt−1) = ming˜t,y˜t(
1
2
(

λ
pi2H,t+
w
λ˜w
(piwt )
2 +(1+ϕ)y˜2 +
χ
1− α (g˜t − y˜t)
2)+βEtV (ω˜t, ωnt )), (48)
subject to the two Phillips curves, (34) and (35), after replacing inflationary expectations with
linear forecasting rules, EtpiH,t+1 = f1ω˜t+f2ωnt and Etpi
w
t+1 = g1ω˜t+g2ω
n
t and the evolution of real
wages (36).2 The problem can be recast as an unconstrained problem, by simultaneously solving
2The forecasting rules are known to be linear in the state variables, given the linear-quadratic nature of the
problem - see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
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the two Phillips curves with the real wage evolution equation so that price and wage inflation are
expressed as a function of the state variables, control variables and exogenous shocks,
piH,t = φ1ω˜t−1+φ2ωnt−1+φ3(
(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
y˜t− γ1− γ g˜t−ln(1− τ˜t)+µ˜
w
t )+φ4(− ln(1− τ˜ st )+µ˜t) (49)
and
piwt = ψ1ω˜t−1 +ψ2ω
n
t−1 +ψ3(
(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
y˜t− γ1− γ g˜t− ln(1− τ˜t)+µ˜
w
t )+ψ4(− ln(1− τ˜ st )+µ˜t) (50)
where the parameters φi and ψi, i = 1, .., 4 are a combination of model parameters and the ‘guess’
parameters from the forecasting equations, and then substituting these into the Bellman equation.
Although it is typically difficult to obtain a closed form solution to problems under discretion, it is
possible to derive the optimal balance between monetary and fiscal policy at each point in time.3
The first order conditions from the optimisation with respect to y˜t and g˜t are given by
χ
1− α(g˜t− y˜t)− (1+ϕ)y˜t+
(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
(φ3

λ
piH,t+ψ3
w
λ˜w
piwt +β(ψ3−φ3)EtVω(ω˜t, ωnt )) = 0, (51)
− χ
1− α(g˜t − y˜t)−
γ
1− γ (φ3

λ
piH,t + ψ3
w
λ˜w
piwt + β(ψ3 − φ3)EtVω(ω˜t, ωnt )) = 0. (52)
Together (51) and (52) imply that g˜t = 0 also holds under discretion.
3.3.3 Results
The previous two sub-sections allows us to state our key result for this model. Optimal policy,
under discretion and commitment, involves keeping the government spending gap at zero whatever
the shock hitting the economy. This result is of considerable importance. It tells us that there is
no role for government spending as a stabilisation device. While this might seem straightforward
in cases where monetary policy can eliminate all loses (i.e. for technology shocks where wages are
3See also Eser (2006), Eser (2009). A full solution to a closed economy variant of this problem can be found in
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007b) is implicit in the union-wide problem considered in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008).
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flexible), it is far less transparent when we have additional distortions. In this situation we might
have supposed that a second best result applied: some deviation of public good provision from its
steady state optimal allocation might have been justified to offset other distortions that monetary
policy was unable to eliminate. For example, following a positive mark-up shock, might it not
have been helpful to cut government spending to achieve a more balanced reduction in demand?
Or, alternatively, could the impact on output of a restrictive monetary policy have been partially
cushioned through an expansionary fiscal policy? The result demonstrated here shows that neither
is the case.
The intuition behind this result is not straightforward, but is worth pursuing because it indicates
its generality. Take the example of a positive mark-up shock, which requires policy to deflate the
economy, which helps reduce both price and wage inflation. Policy can do this through some
combination of raising interest rates or cutting government spending. Suppose it only does the
former. This causes consumers to reduce their consumption and labour supply compared to the
optimal, flexible price level. We can then ask whether changing government spending could improve
social welfare. Changing the government spending gap is clearly costly because we move away
from the optimal provision of public goods, but are there benefits in the trade-off with inflation?
The answer is no, because fiscal policy is inherently inefficient compared to monetary policy in
influencing inflation. Monetary policy acts both to reduce demand, by reducing consumption, but
also to raise supply, as workers reduce their leisure in line with consumption. Government spending
acts only on the demand side.
We can make this point more precisely as follows. The ‘real’ part of the objective function
is a second-order approximation to the household’s utility function after substituting the resource
constraint, the international risk-sharing condition and the production function. It therefore rep-
resents the unconstrained problem facing the social planner, assuming all firms and households are
identical. Consequently, the policymaker’s ideal would be to replicate the social planner’s aggregate
allocation by setting the gaps in the real part of the objective function to zero. However, in a world
of sticky prices and wages it is not possible to achieve this allocation in the face of shocks which
generate price and wage dispersion since this implies heterogeneity across firms and households. We
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deviating from the aggregate social planner’s allocation and minimising the price dispersion costs
generated as the economy returns to its ecient allocation. In our sticky price/wage economy the
rate of wage adjustment is driven by the extent to which households lie o their labour supply
curves,
e = (1 + ) ˜  
1 (˜  ˜) ˜  ln(1 	˜ ) + 


 (53)
when e , the forcing variable in the New Keynesian Phillips curve for wages, is positive workers
are lying below their labour supply curves and are attempting to raise wages. The greater the size
of e, the faster the speed of wage adjustment. This wage adjustment, in turn aects the rate of
price adjustment of rms as they attempt to return to their labour demand curves. The policy
maker must therefore use their policy instruments, ˜ and ˜, to obtain the appropriate balance
between minimising the deviation from the socal planner’s aggregate allocation and the optimal
speed of price and wage adjustment. While this is an intertemporal problem, the balance between
the two instruments in any given period is not. We can consider the optimal balance between the
two instruments by adding a second line to the diagram in Figure 1 capturing the combinations of
˜ and ˜ which generate a given level of wage pressure, e. The slope of these ‘iso-pressure’ lines
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can represent (see Figure 1) the losses from deviating from the social planner’s aggregate allocation
as a se of iso-loss ellipses in government sp nding and utput gap space where the slope of a given
iso-loss ellipse is given by
dy˜t
dg˜t
=
− χ1−α(g˜t − y˜t)
(1 + ϕ)y˜t − χ1−α(g˜t − y˜t)
Note that when g˜t = 0 the slope is given by
dy˜t
dg˜t
=
χ
1−α
(1 + ϕ) + χ1−α
.
At any point in time the policy maker must strike a balance between minimising the losses from
deviating from the aggregate social planner’s allocation and minimising the price dispersion costs
generated as the economy returns to its efficient allocation. In our sticky price/wage economy the
rate of wage adjustment is driven by the extent to which households lie off their labour supply
curves,
x˜t = (1 + ϕ) y˜t − χ1− α(g˜t − y˜t)− ω˜t − ln(1− τ˜t) + µ
w
t
When x˜t, the forcing variable in the New Keynesian Phillips curve for wages, is positive workers
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are lying below their labour supply curves and are attempting to raise wages. The greater the size
of x˜t, the faster the speed of wage adjustment. This wage adjustment, in turn affects the rate of
price adjustment of firms as they attempt to return to their labour demand curves. The policy
maker must therefore use their policy instruments, y˜t and g˜t, to obtain the appropriate balance
between minimising the deviation from the social planner’s aggregate allocation and the optimal
speed of price and wage adjustment. While this is an intertemporal problem, the balance between
the two instruments in any given period is not. We can consider the optimal balance between the
two instruments by adding a second line to the diagram in Figure 1 capturing the combinations of
y˜t and g˜t which generate a given level of wage pressure, x˜t. The slope of these ‘iso-pressure’ lines
are given by
dy˜t
dg˜t
=
χ
1−α
(1 + ϕ) + χ1−α
which is tangential to the iso-loss ellipse when g˜t = 0. In other words, the policy maker minimises the
losses from achieving a given level of wage pressure (positive or negative) by setting the government
spending gap to zero.
The positive slope of the wage pressure line is crucial to understanding why a simple notion of
’burden sharing’ is misleading. Following a positive markup shock, monetary policy will create a
negative output gap by reducing private consumption. In these circumstances, it might be thought
that welfare could be improved by keeping the output gap unchanged, but reducing the consumption
gap by creating a negative government spending gap so that monetary and fiscal policy share the
burden of controlling inflation. If the wage pressure line was horizontal, then we could move to a
lower iso-loss ellipse in this way. But the wage pressure line has a positive slope: raising consumption
by cutting public spending would reduce labour supply, so wage pressure would increase even if the
output gap was unchanged.
The key to obtaining this result is that wage and price setters are attempting to return to
labour demand and supply curves which evaluate the trade-off between consumption and leisure
in the same way as the social planner. The result would not hold if the economy was distorted
such that there was an endogenous wedge between the social planner’s evaluation of the marginal
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rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure and the wage-setters’ evaluation of
the MRS. Such an endogenous wedge could be due to, for example, habits induced by consump-
tion externalities or steady-state monopolistic competition or tax distortions. Suppose the wedge
between private and social MRS is given by the following log-linearised function, φ(g˜t, y˜t). In this
case the slope of the iso-pressure line would be given by,
dy˜t
dg˜t
=
χ
1−α +
∂φ(g˜t,y˜t)
∂g˜t
(1 + ϕ) + χ1−α +
∂φ(g˜t,y˜t)
∂y˜t
which would no longer necessarily be tangential to the iso-loss ellipse at g˜t = 0. In other words vari-
ations in the government spending gap are only an effective policy tool (assuming the policymaker
has control of the output gap through monetary policy) when there are additional distortions in
the economy implying that the private and social evaluations of the MRS differ.
To make this point clearer, consider an example where the private evaluation of the elasticity
of the disutility of labour, ϕ, differs from the social evaluation of this elasticity, ϕs, due to an
externality. For example when ϕ < (>)ϕs workers are under (over)-estimating the marginal social
cost of working. Assuming that this externality has been corrected in steady-state4, the wedge
between the private and public evaluation of the marginal rate of substitution is given by, φ(g˜t, y˜t) =
(ϕs − ϕ)y˜t and the point of tangency between the iso-loss ellipse and the iso-pressure line is given
by
(1 + ϕs)
y˜t
g˜t − y˜t = 1 + ϕ
such that g˜t > (<)0 when ϕ > (<)ϕs. In other words when the social disutility of labour supply is
greater than workers’ private evaluation of that disutility the government spending gap is negative
(rather than zero) as, in addition to stabilising the sticky-price economy in the face of shocks, the
policymaker seeks to correct the household’s suboptimally high supply of labour by reducing public
consumption, freeing resources for private consumption and discouraging labour supply. However,
it should be noted that standard reasons for such externalities - for example, habits effects, tax
4A steady-state subsidy of (1−κ) = (1− α+ χ)ϕ−ϕ
s
1+ϕs (1− 1

)(1− 1
w
)(1− τs)(1− τ)/(1− α) will ensure that the
steady-state remains efficient in the presence of this additional externality.
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distortions and monopolistic competition inefficiencies - do not give rise to quantitatively significant
fluctuations in the government spending gap.5
Finally, we should note that the proposition applies to the government spending gap, and not
to the level of government spending. As our discussion of the central planner’s problem makes
clear, any shock that raises the natural level of output will also imply a matching adjustment to
the optimal provision of public goods. It should also be clear that the existence of unconstrained
monetary policy, enabling policy to effectively control consumption, is critical to this result. As
Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) show, in a similar model without wage inertia, a monetary union member
facing idiosyncratic shocks will be varying the government spending gap.
4 Extensions
Two questions naturally arise from this result. The first is how robust it might be to extensions to
the model. While a comprehensive answer to this question is not possible in a single paper, we look
at two important examples: inflation inertia and government debt. In the case of inflation inertia,
we show analytically that our proposition is unchanged: the optimal government spending gap is
zero. In the case of debt, we show that our analytical result no longer holds, because the optimal
response to any shock is to allow a permanent change in debt, which in part will be financed by a
change in government spending. However, our analysis shows that government spending is still not
being used as a device for stabilising output and inflation when debt is added to the model. This
helps to explain numerical results in other studies. A second question is whether the absence of a
stabilisation role for government spending under optimal policy extends to tax instruments as well.
A final section of the paper shows that it does not, and why there is a clear difference between tax
changes and spending changes in this respect.
5Leith et al. (2009) consider a sticky-price economy subject to ‘deep’ habits as in Ravn et al. (2006), where
households do not internalise the externalities associated with their consumption decisions over individual goods.
For a commonly used parameterisation this implies that steady-state consumption is 50% higher than that which
would be chosen by a social planner. Despite this massive externality the use of the government spending gap as
stabilisation instrument remains negligible. This is also true for tax and monopolistic competition distortions where
the absolute size of the distortion is typically smaller.
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4.1 Inflation Inertia
A common theme of a number of empirical studies is that the economy is subject to some degree
of inflation inertia, in the sense that lagged inflation appears alongside expected inflation in the
Phillips curve. A number of recent papers have examined the implications of inflation inertia for
optimal monetary policy (e.g. Steinsson (2003), Sheedy (2007), Kirsanova et al. (2007)). In order
to demonstrate the robustness of our key proposition to the addition of inflation persistence to
the model, we assume that some price and wage setters follow backward-looking rules of thumb.
The structure of our set-up is similar to Steinsson (2003). Specifically, when a firm is given the
opportunity of posting a new price, we assume that rather than posting the profit maximising price
(70), a proportion of those firms, ζ, follows a simple rule of thumb in resetting that price:
P bt = P
∗
t−1Πt−1 (MCt−1e
µt−1)δ , (53)
where P ∗t−1 denotes an index of the prices given by
lnP ∗t−1 = (1− ζ) lnP ft−1 + ζP bt−1. (54)
and MCt−1eµt−1 > 1 captures the extent to which the price is less than marginal cost after adjusting
for the desired mark-up or, equivalently, the extent to which the typical firm lies below their labour
demand curve.
Note that unlike Steinsson (2003) we specify the rule of thumb as a function of the extent to
which the firm lies off its labour demand curve rather than output. The rule implies that firms
posting a rule of thumb price do so by taking the optimal price from the previous period, scaling it
up by last periods rate of inflation and further scaling it up to the extent that last period’s price was
below its (static) profit maximising level. As Steinsson (2003)’s model involves a closed economy
without government spending and with only price inertia, then labour market disequilibrium and
output move together, so the two formulations are equivalent. When δ = 0 the rule of thumb
reduces to that considered by Gal´ı and Gertler (1999).
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Denoting the fixed share of price-setters following the rule of thumb (53) by ζ, we can derive
a price inflation Phillips Curve as detailed in appendix A.5. For this we combine these rule of
thumb price and wage setters with the wage and price setting described above, leading to the price
Phillips-Curve
piH,t = χfβEtpiH,t+1 + χbpiH,t−1 + κc(m˜ct + µ˜t) + κb(m˜ct−1 + µ˜t−1), (55)
where m˜ct + µt = ω˜t − ln(1− τ˜ s), χf ≡ θΦ , χb ≡ ζΦ , κc ≡ (1−θ)[(1−ζ)(1−θβ)−θβζδ]Φ κb ≡ (1−θ)ζδΦ , where
Φ ≡ θ(1 + βζ) + (1− θ)ζ.
Unlike Steinsson (2003) where rule of thumb behaviour is restricted to price-setting, we employ
a similar set-up in the labour market where ζw of wage-setters who have been given the signal to
re-set wages do so according to the rule of thumb
W bt = W
∗
t−1pi
w
t−1
(
Xt−1
X
)δw
, (56)
where lnXt ≡ ϕnt+ wϕwt+ ct+pt− ln(1− τt)+µwt . Analogous to the price setting rule, Xt−1 > 1
captures the extent to which wage-setters lay below their labour supply curves in the previous
period. When δw = 0, this reduces to the rule of thumb for wage setting considered by Leith and
Malley (2005).
We define ζw as the fixed share of wage-setters following (56). Appendix A.5 shows how to
obtain the wage-inflation Phillips curve
piwt = χ
w
f βEtpi
w
t+1 + χ
w
b pi
w
t−1 + κ
w
c x˜t + κ
w
b x˜t−1, (57)
where xt ≡ ϕnt + wϕwt + ct + pt − ln(1− τt) + µwt , which can be written as x˜t =
(
ϕ+ 11−γ
)
y˜t −
γ
1−γ g˜t − ω˜ − ln(1 − τ˜t) + µ˜wt , and χwf ≡ θwΦw , χwb ≡
ζw
Φw
, κwc ≡ (1−θw)(1−ζw)Φw
(
1−θwβ
1+ϕw
− ζwδwθwβ1−ζw
)
,
κwb ≡ (1−θw)ζwδwΦw .
The rule of thumb behaviour adds price and wage inflation persistence to the model, while the
presence of the activity variables in each rule of thumb add additional dynamics in the forcing
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variables driving price and wage inflation. However, the relationship between the government
spending gap and output gap in the lagged forcing term driving wage inflation is identical to the
relationship in the current period forcing term (i.e. these gaps only appear in x˜t and x˜t−1) and
equivalently in the term that would occur if there were no rule of thumb price setters. This will be
crucial below.
To consider the impact this generalisation has on optimal policy we must rederive the objective
function, since the evolution of price dispersion (which underpins the presence of the quadratic
term in inflation) will be affected by the rule of thumb behaviour. Using Steinsson (2003)6, we can
show that the objective function can be written as − (1−α+χ)2
∑∞
t=0 β
tLt + t.i.p. + o ‖a‖3 with the
per period loss function defined as
Lt =

λ
pi2H,t +
w
λ˜w
(piwt )
2 + (1 + ϕ)y˜2 +
χ
1− α (g˜t − y˜t)
2 (58)
+

λ
ζ
(1− ζ)θ [pit − (pit−1 + (1− θ)δ(m˜ct−1 + µ˜t−1)]
2
+
w
λ˜w
ζw
(1− ζw)θw [pi
w
t − (piwt−1 + (1− θw)δwx˜t−1)]2. (59)
Rule of thumb price and wage setters introduce the last two terms in this per period loss
function. While this greatly complicates the optimal policy trade-offs between inflation, output
and the change in inflation, as discussed in Steinsson (2003), a key point to note in the current
context is that the additional terms in the government spending and output gaps are constrained
to be in the form governed by x˜t−1, which is the same as the forcing variable in the NKPC.
Given the loss function (58) the Lagrangian is
6Note the errata on his website.
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Lt = −12
∞∑
t=0
βt[

λ
pi2H,t +
w
λ˜w
(piwt )
2 + (1 + ϕ)y˜2 +
χ
1− α (g˜t − y˜t)
2
+

λ
ω
(1− ω)θ [pit − (pit−1 + (1− θ)δm˜ct−1)]
2
+
w
λ˜w
ωw
(1− ωw)θw [pi
w
t − (piwt−1 + (1− θw)δwx˜t−1)]2
− 2Λpct (χfβEtpiH,t+1 + χbpiH,t−1 + κc(m˜ct + µ˜t) + κb(m˜ct−1 + µ˜t−1)− piH,t)
− 2Λpcwt (χwf βEtpiwt+1 + χwb piwt−1 + κwc x˜t + κwb x˜t−1 − piwt )
− 2Λwt (ω˜t−1 − pit + piwt −∆ωnt − ω˜t)].
(60)
In order to reconsider the impact of these extensions on our key result we need to undertake
the same optimisation we did previously. Here we focus on the first-order conditions for output
and government spending
− (1 + ϕ)y˜t + χ1− α(g˜t − y˜t) +
(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
(κwc Λ
pcw
t + κ
w
b βΛ
pcw
t+1) = 0 (61)
− χ
1− α(g˜t − y˜t)−
χ
1− α(κ
w
c Λ
pcw
t + κ
w
b βΛ
pcw
t+1) = 0. (62)
We can combine these optimality conditions (together with γ = χ1−α+χ), and once again we obtain
g˜t = 0.
Thus, in a richer model with persistence in wage and price inflation and where the lags in the
forcing variables influence wage and/or price inflation, our key proposition re-emerges unscathed.
Despite the fact that monetary policy will seek to influence the path of the output gap in the face
of shocks, under the optimal commitment policy, there is no desire to deviate from a government
spending gap of zero.
We can now return to an issue we considered earlier, the definition of the activity variable
in the rule of thumb price and wage setting behaviour. If we had adopted a definition of the
activity variable which didn’t reflect the extent of wage and/or price disequilibrium then there
24
would be scope for the policymaker to use the government spending gap to exploit this difference
in price/wage setting.7 However, as the above analysis shows, this use of government spending
as a stabilisation tool would depend entirely on the ad-hoc use of an activity variable unrelated
to profit/utility maximising behaviour in rule of thumb price setting behaviour, rather than the
existence of rule of thumb price setters per se.
4.2 Government Debt
In this subsection we consider the impact of introducing government debt into our analysis of
policy within a small open economy.8 Until now we have assumed that there was a lump-sum
tax instrument which was utilised to balance the budget whenever other fiscal instruments were
used in a stabilisation role. In this section, any inconsistency between government tax revenues and
spending will affect government debt. Policy must then ensure that any relevant government budget
constraint is satisfied. Lump-sum taxes remain, but only to finance the steady-state subsidy; they
cannot be varied out of steady state.
The flow budget constraint for our economy has the form
Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + PtGt − PtYtτ st −WtNtτt, (63)
where Bt is government debt. Rewriting this in real terms and in a form consistent with the
definitions of the tax rates in terms of gaps we obtain
Bt
Pt
= Rt−1
Pt−1
Pt
Bt−1
Pt−1
− Yt +Gt + Yt(1− τ st ) +
Wt
Pt
Nt(1− τt)− Wt
Pt
Nt. (64)
7See Stehn and Vines (2007) for example.
8In Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005), we consider the significance of adding debt to New Keynesian models of
monetary policy more fully.
25
This can be log-linearised as
bt = Rbt−1 +R(rt−1 − pit) + G
B
lnGt +
(1− τ s)Y
B
ln(1− τ st )
−τ
sY
B
yt +
(1− τ)rwN
B
ln(1− τt)− τrwN
B/P
(rwt + nt)
−R lnB −R(r)− G
B
lnG− (1− τ
s)Y
b
ln(1− τ t)
−τ
sY
B
Y
i +
(1− τ)rwN
B
ln(1− τ)− τrwN
B
(rw + n),
where bt = ln(BtPt ) and B = (B/P ). Rewriting in gap form, using the production function to first
order, y˜t = n˜t, this can be written as
b˜t = Rb˜t−1 +R(r˜t−1 − pit) + G
b
g˜t +
(1− τ s)y
b
ln(1− τ˜ st )
−(τ
sY
B
+
τrwN
B
)y˜t +
(1− τ)rwN
B
ln(1− τ˜t)− τrwN
B
(rw˜t)
The welfare function remains unchanged, so the Lagrangian of our policy problem has this
additional constraint with lagrange multiplier Λbt added to it. As the budget constraint also involves
the real interest rate gap, we also need to reintroduce the IS curve constraint, with multiplier Λist
Lt = −12
∞∑
t=0
βt[

λ
pi2H,t +
w
λ˜w
(piwt )
2 + (1 + ϕ)y˜2 +
χ
1− α (g˜t − y˜t)
2
− 2Λpct (βEtpiH,t+1 + λ (ω˜t − ln(1− τ˜ st ) + µ˜t)− piH,t)
− 2Λpcwt (βEtpiwt+1 + λ˜w
[(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
y˜t − γ1− γ g˜t − ω˜t − ln(1− τ˜t) + µ˜
w
t
]
− piwt )
− 2Λwt (ω˜t−1 − pit + piwt −∆ωnt − ω˜t)
− 2Λist (y˜t − γg˜t − E{y˜t+1 − γg˜t+1 + (1 + γ)pit+1}+ (1− γ)r˜t)
− 2Λbt(b˜t −Rb˜t−1 −R(r˜t−1 − pit)− bg g˜t − bτs ln(1− τ˜ st )
+ byy˜t − bτ ln(1− τ˜t) + brwrw˜t)],
(65)
where bg = GB , bτs =
(1−τs)Y
B
,by = τrwNB +
τrwN
B
,bτ =
(1−τ)rwN
B
, and brw = τrwNB . The first order
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condition under commitment for the interest rate is given by
(1− γ)Λyt − EtΛbt+1 = 0. (66)
Here monetary policy must now take account of its impact on the government’s finances. The
first-order condition for debt is
Λbt − EtΛbt+1 = 0,
which implies that, E0Λbt = Λ
b ∀t . In other words, following a shock policy must ensure that the
‘cost’ of the government’s budget constraint is constant. This is the basis of the random walk result
of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004). The first-order condition for the government spending gap is
− χ
1− α (g˜t − y˜t)− λ˜w
γ
1− γΛ
pcw
t − γΛyt + β−1γΛyt−1 − bgΛbt = 0
and that of the output gap
−(1 + ϕ)y˜t + χ1− α (g˜t − y˜t)− λ˜w
(
ϕ+
1
1− γ
)
Λpcwt + Λ
y
t − β−1Λyt−1 + byΛbt = 0.
For t > 0 these can be combined as
− (1 + ϕ) g˜t + φΛbt = 0, (67)
where φ = −
(
ϕ+ 1−α+χ1−α
)
1−α
χ bg+ϕ(1−β−1)+by.9 Equation (67) implies that the need to finance
the government’s budget constraint forces the policymaker to adjust the government spending gap.
However, given that Λbt is constant in the absence of new information, this condition implies that
there will be a permanent deviation of the government spending gap from zero following a shock
with fiscal consequences. In other words, beyond the need to ensure the intertemporal budget
9 Note that policy instruments may be used to exploit the fact that expectations are taken as given in the initial
period as the policymaker seeks to reduce the size of the cost of satisfying the government budget constraint, Λbt
through such devices as inflation surprises when debt is nominal - see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2008). However, from
that point on, in the absence of new information, the government spending gap will be constant and will not play
any countercyclical role.
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constraint is satisfied, there is no attempt to further adjust the government spending gap as a
means of stabilising the economy. Here the government spending gap is being used to stabilise
debt, and not to stabilise output and inflation following shocks.
The reason why the government spending gap is used to finance the new steady-state level of
debt following shocks with fiscal consequences mirrors the reason why it is not used as a stabilisation
device more generally. Whereas the stabilisation problem required the policymaker to achieve the
biggest correction to inflationary pressure from a given welfare cost of efficiency gaps, the financing
of government debt requires the greatest fiscal correction without generating inflationary pressure.
Accordingly, an appropriate combination of higher taxation and lower government spending can
service higher debt (without generating inflation) more effectively than utilising the tax instrument
alone.
This result may help us understand some results in the literature. Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis
(2007), examine a model which is very similar to a closed economy version of our model with
debt. Monetary policy is optimal (operating under commitment), and fiscal policy is either chosen
optimally or is restricted to a simple rule whose only argument is the stock of government debt.
This simple rule is described as ‘fiscal feedback’, and cuts the government spending gap relative
to steady state if debt rises above steady state. This rule precludes any demand management
role for government spending. The focus of the paper is on the implications of different speeds of
fiscal feedback for both monetary policy and the economy as a whole. One result they obtain is
that feedback that just stabilises debt comes very close to duplicating the optimal policy for debt,
which is that steady state debt follows a random walk. The difference in social welfare following a
standard cost-push shock is of the order of 0.002% of steady state consumption. Thus an optimal
simple fiscal rule which prevents any countercyclical fiscal role is a restriction with negligible welfare
costs, and therefore by implication any additional fiscal demand management would at best make
a negligible contribution to social welfare. The reason for this numerical result becomes apparent
given the analysis in this section.10
The reason why the government spending gap is used to finance the new steady-state level of
10Stehn and Vines (2008) also find that fiscal policy is inactive following cost-push shocks, and note some of the
reasons for this discussed above.
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debt following shocks with fiscal consequences mirrors the reason why it is not used as a stabilisation
device more generally.Whereas the stabilisation problem required the policymaker to achieve the
biggest correction to inflationary pressure from a given welfare cost of efficiency gaps, the financing
of government debt requires the greatest fiscal correction without generating inflationary pressure.
Accordingly, an appropriate combination of higher taxation and lower government spending can
service higher debt (without generating inflation) more effectively than utilising the tax instrument
alone.
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) compares alternative fiscal and monetary policy rules with a
Ramsey policy, using a fairly elaborate model with capital, money and debt, but one which can
be viewed as an extension of the closed economy version of our baseline model. Although their
fiscal rules involve income taxes rather than government spending, they are restricted to feedback
on government debt alone, and so they exclude any direct countercyclical role.11 They also find
that, when their monetary policy rules are suitably aggressive, these two rules combined come close
to replicating the Ramsey policy. The cost of following simple rules for both monetary and fiscal
policy compared to the Ramsey policy can be as low as 0.003% of steady state consumption. By
implication, the cost of excluding any countercyclical role for fiscal policy must be at least as small
as this number.
Our analysis suggests that adding government debt to our analysis does not alter our conclusions
in a material way. However, it is important to note that here, at least, the assumption that policy
can be time inconsistent is important for the welfare consequences of shocks. Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2007b) show that under discretion, steady state debt no longer follows a random walk. Instead,
fiscal or monetary instruments must be used to bring debt back to its original, pre-shock level,
on the assumption that this level was efficient. Taking the example of a technology shock in our
baseline model, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a) show that allowing for debt adds around 13% to
welfare costs under discretion, compared to 2.4% under commitment.
11We argue below that taxes, rather than government spending, can play a complementary role to monetary policy
when there are cost-push shocks or wage inertia. The models in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) do not include either
distortion.
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4.3 Taxes
So far we have focused on government spending as an instrument of fiscal policy. In our view this
comes closest to representing fiscal policy as a demand management tool, which is the theme of this
paper. We have shown that there is no role for government spending as part of a countercyclical
policy if monetary policy is optimal and unconstrained. However, it would be quite incorrect to
infer from this that fiscal policy in general has no short-term stabilisation role. In our analysis
so far, we assumed both tax rates were fixed. Suppose instead that we allowed them to vary in
an optimal manner. Using the Lagrangian (40) from our baseline model, we would obtain two
additional first order conditions. For the production tax gap, ln(1− τ˜ s), it is
λλpit = 0. (68)
Thus the NKPC for prices ceases to be a constraint on maximising welfare, as production tax
changes can offset the impact of any other variables driving price inflation. In particular production
taxes that can vary period by period can eliminate completely any mark-up shocks.
Similarly, the condition for income taxes is given by
λ˜wλ
piw
t = 0. (69)
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a) show that a combination of production and income taxes, combined
with an optimal monetary policy, can completely eliminate the impact of technology shocks on
social welfare when we have sticky wages.
These two conditions show that tax changes work in distinctly complementary ways to monetary
policy. In the first case, production taxes represent a distortionary tax that works on the same
margin as a distortionary shock, so we can use one distortion to offset another. This point would
hold in a flexible price world. In the second case, income taxes help offset the impact of nominal
wage rigidity. As we noted above, monetary policy alone cannot eliminate the impact of technology
shocks when both nominal wage and price inertia are present. So here, changes in taxes can clearly
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assist monetary policy in its stabilising role. This result may be an example of a more general
point. There may be other examples where different degrees of nominal inertia among different
agents or sectors can lead to distortionary movements in relative prices, and where there exists a
tax instruments that may be able to offset these relative price changes. One example might be
taxes on domestic sales and differences in inertia between traded and non-traded goods.
Why do tax changes appear to be a useful complement to monetary policy in these situations
when changes in government spending were not? The key point is that taxes are useful because they
help change relative prices in a way that monetary policy cannot. In contrast, the stabilisation
role for government spending is in changing demand, and here it can do nothing to assist an
unconstrained optimal monetary policy.
5 Conclusion
As recent events have shown, there remain occasions in which policymakers wish to supplement
monetary policy with fiscal action to control the business cycle, but macroeconomists appear divided
on whether and when such action is warranted. This paper attempts to clarify that debate, asking
whether fiscal action in the form of changes to the government spending gap can assist a fully
optimal and unconstrained monetary policy under commitment.
In our baseline model, which includes both nominal wage and price rigidity, we show that
optimal fiscal policy should play no role in helping to stabilise output or inflation, whether shocks
come from technology, preferences or price mark-ups, and whether the economy is open or closed.
The optimal government spending gap is always zero. In this context, monetary policy is indeed
all we need. This is despite the fact that, in the presence of wage as well as price inertia, or for
cost-push shocks under just price inertia, optimal monetary policy is unable to eliminate the welfare
costs of such shocks.
These analytic results are robust to supplementing the model with forms of inflation inertia.
When we assume lump sum taxes are no longer available to prevent shocks and policy from changing
government debt, the optimal government spending gap is no longer zero. However we show
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analytically that the government spending gap moves in a way which optimally finances a new
level of government debt, and so it continues not to play any stabilisation role. This helps explain
numerical results in two recent papers12, where fiscal policy that is constrained to follow simple
feedback rules from debt can come close to replicating the unconstrained social optimum.
Finally, we use our baseline model to show that these results apply only to government spending
as an instrument, representing a demand management role for fiscal policy. We note situations in
which variations in tax rates, by changing the relative price of leisure, can play a complementary
role to monetary policy. It is therefore incorrect to conclude that fiscal policy in all its forms can
play no useful role in short term stabilisation. We should also stress that our analysis of the demand
management role of fiscal policy is confined to cases where monetary policy is both optimal and
unconstrained: interest rates can be costlessly adjusted to influence consumption and there are, for
example, no problems with interest rates hitting a lower bound.
A Appendix
A.1 Price Setting
Facing the objective function (19), the optimal price set by firms that are able to reset prices in
period t is
PH,t =

− 1
Et
∑∞
s=0(θ)
sQt,t+s
[
(1− κ)Wt+sPt+s P H,t+s
Yt+s
At+s
]
Et
∑∞
s=0(θ)sQt,t+s
[
(1− τ rt+s)P−1t+sP H,t+sYt+s
] . (70)
In equilibrium βs
(
Ct
Ct+s
)(
Pt
Pt+s
)
= Qt,t+s, so that the expression for the optimal price can be
re-written as
PH,t =

− 1
Et
∑∞
s=0(θβ)
s CtPt
Ct+sPt+s
[
(1− κ)Wt+sPt+s P H,t+s
Yt+s
At+s
]
Et
∑∞
s=0(θβ)s
CtPt
Ct+sPt+s
[
(1− τ rt+s)P−1t+sP H,t+sYt+s
]
Allowing the mark-up to be time varying due to mark-up shocks, this can be log-linearised as
pH,t = (1− θβ)Et
( ∞∑
s=0
(θwβ)s
[−at+s + wt+s − ln(1− τ rt+s)− v + µt]
)
12Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2007) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
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where pH,t is the log of the optimal price set by those firms that were able to set price in period t
and µt is a shock to the desired mark-up. Quasi-differencing this expression yields,
1
1− θβ pH,t =
1
1− θβ θβEtpH,t+1 − at + wt − ln(1− τ
r
t )− v + µt
Domestic prices evolve according to PH,t =
[
(1− θ)P 1−H,t + θP 1−H,t−1
] 1
1− , or log-linearised
pH,t = (1− θ)pH,t + θpH,t−1. (71)
Solving for pH,t and substituting into the expression for quasi-differenced optimal price yields
1
1− θβ
(
pH,t
1− θ −
θpH,t−1
1− θ
)
=
1
1− θβ θβ
(
EtpH,t+1
1− θ −
θpH,t
1− θ
)
−at + wt − ln(1− τ rt )− v + µt
This can be solved as (20).
A.2 Wage Setting
Recall the optimal wage set by those households that are able to re-set wages in period t,
W (k)−1−ϕwt =
Et
(∑∞
s=0(θw)
s
[
Qt,t+sW
w
t+sNt+s(1− τt+s)
])
Et
(∑∞
s=0(θw)s
[
Qt,t+sµwW
w(1+ϕ)
t+s N
1+ϕ
t+s Ct+sPt+s
]) (72)
Note that in equilibrium βs
(
Ct
Ct+s
)(
Pt
Pt+s
)
= Qt,t+s. Accordingly the expression for the optimal
re-set wage is given by
W
−1−ϕw
t =
Et
(∑∞
s=0(θwβ)
s
[
W wt+sNt+s(1− τt+s)C−1t+sP−1t+s
])
Et
(∑∞
s=0(θwβ)s
[
µwW
w(1+ϕ)
t+s N
1+ϕ
t+s
]) (73)
After introducing a time varying desired mark-up, µwt , this expression can be log-linearised as
1 + ϕw
1− θwβwt = Et
( ∞∑
s=0
(θwβ)s [ϕnt+s + wϕwt+s + ct+s + pt+s − ln(1− τt+s) + µwt ]
)
(74)
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Quasi-differencing this expression yields
1 + ϕw
1− θwβwt =
1 + ϕw
1− θwβawβEtwt+1 + ϕnt+s + wϕwt+s + ct+s + pt+s − ln(1− τt+s) + µ
w
t (75)
The wage index evolves according to the law of motion Wt =
[
(1− θw)W (1−w)t + θwW 1−wt−1
] 1
1−w ,
which log-linearised gives
wt = (1− θw)wt + θwwt−1 (76)
(74) and (76) can be solved for wage inflation to obtain (9).
A.3 Derivation of Loss Function
The measure of social welfare is obtained as a second-order approximation to the utility of the
representative agents (1). Note the following general result relating to second order approximations,
Xt −X
Xt
= x˜t +
1
2
x˜2t + o ‖a‖3 (77)
where o ‖a‖3 represents terms that are of order higher than 3 in the bound ‖a‖ on the amplitude
of the relevant shocks.
The term in consumption can be written as
c˜t = αc˜∗t + (1− α)(y˜t − g˜t). (78)
For simplicity, we can take a log-transformation of (21),
ln(Yt −Gt) = yt + ln(1− Gt
Yt
) = yt − ht, (79)
where ht ≡ − ln(1− GtYt ). We can then work in terms of ht and use the approximation
h˜t =
χ
1− α(g˜t − y˜t) (80)
34
to translate the derivation back into familiar terms in government spending and output.
The term in government spending can be approximated to second order as
lnGt = ln(
Gt
Yt
) + y˜t + t.i.p. = ln(1− exp(−ht)) + y˜ + t.i.p.
=
1− γ
γ
h˜t − 12
1− γ
γ2
h˜2t + y˜t + t.i.p.+ o
(
‖a‖3
)
where γ=G/Y . We can then write, using (29),
χ lnGt = (1− α)h˜t − 12
1− α
γ
h˜2t + χy˜t + t.i.p.+ o ‖a‖3 . (81)
Approximating the labour-supply term of an individual household k to second-order and then
integrating over all households k we obtain
∫ 1
0
Nt(k)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
dk =
(Nn)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ (Nn)1+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
n˜t(k)dk +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)
∫ 1
0
n˜t(k)2dk
)
+ o ‖a‖3 (82)
The linear term in labour supply can be re-expressed as follows, using (84)-(86).
∫ 1
0
n˜t(k) dk = n˜t + w
1− w
2
vark[wt(k)2]. (83)
To obtain this use the demand for labour (7) and take logs so that
∫ 1
0
n˜t(k) dk = n˜t +
∫ 1
0
ln
(
Wt(k)
Wt
)−w
dk. (84)
Letting ŵt(k) = w(k)− wt we find that
(
Wt(k)
Wt
)1−w
= exp[(1− w)ŵt(k)] = 1 + (1− w)ŵH,t(i) + (1− w)
2
2
(ŵH,t(k))
2 + o ‖a‖3 . (85)
From the definition of Wt we have 1 =
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(k)
Wt
)1−w
dk. Therefore integrating the above expres-
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sion across k the expression simplifies to,
Ek[ŵt(k] =
w − 1
2
Ek[ŵt(k)2] =
w − 1
2
vark[wt(k)2]. (86)
n˜t, as detailed i.a. in Gal´ı (2008), can be expressed as
n˜t = y˜t + ln[
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)− di] (87)
= y˜t +

2
vari[pH,t(i)] + o ‖a‖3 (88)
From the definition of the variance we also know that
∫ 1
0
(n˜t(k))2dk = vark{n˜t(k)}+ (
∫ 1
0
(n˜t(k))dk)2, (89)
where vark[n˜t(k)] = 2wvark[wt(k)]. Using (83) and (89) in (82) and combing the latter with (78)
and (81) we obtain
∞∑
t=0
−1− α+ χ
2
βt
(
1− α
χ
h˜2t + (1 + ϕ)y˜
2
t +  varl[pt(l)] + w(1 + ϕw)vark[wt(k)
2]
)
+ tip+ o ‖a‖3
(90)
Woodford (2003), chapter 6, shows that under the assumption of Calvo-pricing
∑
βtvarl[pi,t(l)] =
1
λ
∑
βtpi2i,t. (91)
Given the Calvo price-setting rules in wage-setting this also implies
∞∑
t=0
βtvark[wt(k)] =
1
λw
∞∑
t=0
βt(piwt )
2 + t.i.p+ o ‖a‖3 . (92)
Using (91) and (92) as well as (80) in connection with (29) we obtain (38) and (39).
A.4 Rule of Thumb in Price Setting
The derivation essentially follows Pontiggia (2007).
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The backward-looking price setters follow the rule (53). The forward-looking price-setters solve
the Calvo problem (19) and obtain the first-order condition (70).
Let P ∗t ≡ (1− ζ)(P ft ) + ζ(P bt ) be an index of newly set prices, of which the share (1− ζ) sets P ft
in a forward-looking manner, while the share ζ sets P bt in a backward-looking manner. The current
price level evolves as Pt =
[
θP 1−θt−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−θ
] 1
1−θ . The log-linear versions of the aggregate
price level and the index of new prices are
pt = (1− θ)p∗t + θpt−1 (93)
p∗t = (1− ζ)pft + ζpbt (94)
Subtracting θpt (93) from both sides implies
pit =
1− θ
θ
(p∗t − pt), (95)
while subtracting pt−1 from both sides gives
p∗t − pt−1 =
1
1− θpit. (96)
Substituting (94) into (95) in turn relates inflation to the weighted differences of, respectively, the
difference of forward and backward-looking prices from the aggregate price level:
pit =
1− θ
θ
(
(1− ζ)(pft − pt) + ζ(pbt − pt)
)
(97)
To find an expression for pbt we can simply log-linearize the rule (53) and subtract pt
pbt − pt =
1
1− θpit−1 − pit + δ(mct−1 + µt−1). (98)
As in section A.1 the forward-looking price-setters have the objective function (19) and optimality
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condition (70), which we can write as
pft = (1− θβ)Et
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)s(mct+1 + µt+1), (99)
where mct ≡ ωt − at − ln(1 − τ rt ) is real marginal cost and.µt is a shock to the desired mark-up.
Quasi-differencing (99) and subtracting pt we obtain
pft − pt = θβ(Etpft+1 − pt) + (1− θβ)(mct + µt). (100)
Shifting forward (94) and (98) and combining them we get
p∗t+1 − pt = (1− ζ)(pft − pt) + ζ(p∗t − pt−1 + δ(mct + µt). (101)
Combining (96) and (101) gives
Etp
f
t+1 − pt =
1
(1− θ)(1− ζ)(Etpit+1 − ζpit)−
ζδ
1− ζ (mct + µt). (102)
Substituting (102) into (100) gives
pft − pt =
θβ
(1− θ)(1− ζ)(Etpit+1 − ζpit)−
θβζδ
1− ζ (mct + µt) + (1− θβ)(mct + µt). (103)
Substituting (98) and (103) into (97) finally gives us an expression for the price Phillips-curve
θ(1 + βζ) + (1− θ)ζ
θ
pit = βEtpit+1 +
(1− θ)(1− ζ)(1− θβ)− (1− θ)θβζδ
θ
(mct + µt)
+
ζ
θ
pit−1 +
(1− θ)ζβ
θ
(mct−1 + µt−1).
(104)
A.5 Rule of Thumb in Wage Setting
The backward-looking wage setters follow the rule (56). The forward-looking wage-setters solve the
Calvo problem (8) and obtain the first-order condition (72).
Let W ∗t ≡ (1−ζw)(W ft )+ζw(W bt ) be an index of newly set prices, of which the share (1−ζw) sets
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W ft in a forward-looking manner, while the share ζw sets W
b
t in a backward-looking manner. The
current price level evolves as Wt =
[
θW 1−θwt−1 + (1− θw)(W ∗t )1−θw
] 1
1−θw . The log-linear versions of
the aggregate price level and the index of new prices are
wt = (1− θw)w∗t + θwwt−1, (105)
w∗t = (1− ζw)wft + ζwwbt . (106)
Subtracting θwwt (105) from both sides implies
piwt =
1− θw
θw
(w∗t − wt), (107)
while subtracting wt−1 from both sides gives
w∗t − wt−1 =
1
1− θw pi
w
t . (108)
Substituting (106) into (107) in turn relates inflation to the weighted differences of, respectively,
the difference of forward and backward-looking prices from the aggregate price level
piwt =
1− θw
θw
(
(1− ζw)(wft − wt) + ζw(wbt − wt)
)
. (109)
To find an expression for wbt we can simply log-linearize the rule (56) and subtract wt
wbt − wt =
1
1− θw pi
w
t−1 − piwt + δxt−1. (110)
As in section A.2 the forward-looking price-setters have the objective function (8) and optimality
condition (70), which we can write as
wft = (1− θwβ)Et
∞∑
s=0
(θwβ)sxt+s, (111)
where xt ≡ ϕnt + wϕwt + ct + pt− ln(1− τt) +µwt . Quasi-differencing (111) and subtracting wt we
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obtain
(1− ϕw)(wft − wt) = (1− ϕw)θwβ(Etwft+1 − wt).+ (1− θwβ)xt (112)
Shifting forward (106) and (110) and combining them we get
w∗t+1 − wt = (1− ζw)(wft − wt) + ζw(w∗t − wt−1 + δwxt). (113)
Combining (108) and (113) gives
Etw
f
t+1 − wt =
1
(1− θw)(1− ζw)(Etpi
w
t+1 − ζwpiwt )−
ζwδw
1− ζw xt (114)
Substituting (114) into (112) gives us
wft − wt =
θwβ
(1− θw)(1− ζw)(Etpi
w
t+1 − ζwpiwt )−
θwβζwδw
1− ζw xt +
(1− θwβ)
(1 + ϕw)
xt. (115)
Substituting (110) and (115) into (109) finally gives us an expression for the wage Phillips-curve
θw(1 + βζw) + (1− θw)ζw
θw
piwt = βEtpi
w
t+1 +
(
(1− θw)(1− ζw)
θw
)(
1− θwβ
1 + ϕw
− θwβζwδw
1− ζw
)
xt
+
ζw
θw
piwt−1 +
(1− θw)ζwβ
θw
xt−1.
A.6 Loss Function under Inflation Inertia
A.6.1 Price Dispersion
Log-linearizing the rule of thumb (53), we obtain
pbt = p
∗
t−1 + pit−1 + δ(mct−1 + µt−1) (116)
At each point in the distribution of prices pt(i) consists of past prices, those set in forward-looking
optimizing manner pft and those set backward-looking:
pt(i) = θpt−1(i) + (1− θ)(1− ζ)pft + (1− θ)ζpbt (117)
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Define P t ≡ Eipt(i), which implies P t−P t−1 = Ei[pt(i)−P t−1]. Also recall the index of newly-set
prices, which in log-linear form is
p∗t = (1− ζ)pft + ζpbt . (118)
We can rewrite
P t − P t−1 = θEi[pt(i)− P t−1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+(1− θ)(1− ζ)(pft − P t−1) + (1− θ)ζ(pbt − P t−1)
= (1− θ)(p∗t − P t−1)
(119)
Note that to first-order
P t = pt +O||a||2. (120)
Thus, (119) can be written as
pit = (1− θ)(p∗t − P t−1) +O||a||2. (121)
Furthermore, price-dispersion can be expressed as
vari[pt(i)] = vari[pt(i)− P t−1] = Ei[(pt(i)− P t−1)2]−
(
Eipt(i)− P t−1
)2
= θEi[(pt(i)− P t−1)2] + (1− θ)(1− ζ)(pft − P t−1)2
+ (1− θ)ζ(pbt − P t−1)2 − (P t − P t−1)2
(122)
Using (120) in (116) and subtracting P t−1 we obtain
pbt − P t−1 = p∗t−1 − P t−2 + δ(m˜ct−1 + µt−1) +O||a||2.
=
1
1− θpit−1 + δ(m˜ct−1 + µt−1) +O||a||
2.
(123)
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Using (120), (116),(118) and subtracting P t−1 yields
pft − P t−1 =
1
1− ζ (p
∗
t − P t−1)−
ζ
1− ζ (p
∗
t−1 − P t−2)−
ζδ
1− ζ (m˜ct−1 + µt−1) +O||a||
2
=
1
(1− θ)(1− ζ)pit +
1
(1− θ)(1− ζ)pit−1 −
ζδ
1− ζ (m˜ct−1 + µt−1) +O||a||
2
(124)
Now, combining (120), (123), (124) with (122) we obtain
vari[pt(i)] = θvari[pt−1(i)] +
θ
1− θpi
2
t +
ζ
(1− ζ)(θ) (pit − pit−1 − (1− θ)δ(m˜ct−1 + µt−1))
2 +O||a||2.
(125)
Iterating forward under discounting yields
∞∑
t=0
βtvari[pt(i)] =
θ
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
∞∑
t=0
βt
pi2t + ζθ−1(1− ζ)
 pit − pit−1
−(1− θ)δ(m˜ct−1 + µt−1)

2+O||a||2
A.6.2 Wage Dispersion
Regarding the dispersion of wages vari[wt(i)] we can log-linearize (56) and proceed as in section
A.6.1 to obtain
∞∑
t=0
βtvari[xt(i)] =
θ
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
∞∑
t=0
βt
(piwt )2 + ζwθ−1w(1− ζw)
 piwt − piwt−1
−(1− θw)δwx˜t−1

2+O||a||2
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